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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BETTE WYCALIS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, 
and WARREN H. CURLIS, Its 
President; CITY FEDERAL 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION; 
U.S. TITLE OF UTAH, Trustee; 
CITY CONSUMER SERVICES, INC., 
Beneficiary; R.M. WALL; GARY 
L. MEREDITH and LYLE G. 
MEREDITH; ED MAASS; RANDY 
KRANTZ, B. BRAD CHRISTENSON, 
DEBRA S. CHRISTENSON; R & C 
ASSOCIATES; ROY L. MILLER; 
SHARON L. MILES, and JOHN 
DOES I through X, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This petition for a writ of certiorari is sought 
because the decision of the Court of Appeals below, in one 
broad stroke and in conflict with legal principles established 
by this Court, imposes a duty on persons to anticipate criminal 
activity of third parties and vitiates the reliability of 
properly acknowledged commercial documents. The ramifications 
of this decision are serious and substantial for the entire 
Supreme Cou 
(Utah Court 
No. (88003 
t Case No. 
of Appeals 
(A)-CA) 
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business and legal community. Therefore, the following 
questions are presented by petitioners for review by this Court 
should this petition for a writ of certiorari be granted: 
1. Does a trustee under a deed of trust satisfy its 
duty of care to the beneficiary when it executes and records a 
deed of reconveyance of the trust property in good faith 
reliance on an acknowledged request for reconveyance? 
2. Does a trustee under a deed of trust owe the 
beneficiary any duty to foresee that an acknowledged request 
for reconveyance of the trust property is a forgery? 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals may be found 
as No. 880030(A)-CA of the records of the Utah Court of Appeals 
and as Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, et al., 116 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 27 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
OF COURT 
This petition is brought before the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah pursuant to Rule 42 et seg. of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court. The decision for which review is 
sought was entered by the Utah Court of Appeals on August 29, 
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1989. Petitioners* request for a rehearing was denied by the 
Court of Appeals on September 26, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTE 
The interpretation of the following statute is 
relevant to this matter: 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33 (1953) Satisfaction 
of obligation secured by trust 
deed—Reconveyance of trust property. 
When the obligation secured by any 
trust deed has been satisfied, the trustee 
shall, upon written request by the 
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. 
The reconveyance may designate the grantee 
therein as "the person or persons entitled 
thereto." The beneficiary under such trust 
deed shall deliver to the trustor or his 
successor in interest the trust deed and the 
note or other evidence of the obligation so 
satisfied. Any beneficiary under such trust 
deed who refuses to request a reconveyance 
from the trustee for a period of thirty days 
after written demand therefor is made by the 
trustor or his successor in interest shall 
be liable to the trustor or his successor in 
interest, as the case may be, for double 
damages resulting from such refusal, or such 
trustor or his successor in interest may 
bring an action against the beneficiary and 
trustee to compel a reconveyance of the 
trust property and in such action the 
judgment of the court shall be that the 
trustee reconvey the trust property and that 
the beneficiary pay to the trustor, or his 
successor in interest, as the case may be, 
the costs of suit including a reasonable 
attorney's fee and all damages resulting 
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from the refusal of the beneficiary to 
request a reconveyance as hereinabove 
provided. [Emphasis added,] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case is before this Court on a petition for a writ 
of certiorari. Plaintiff successfully appealed to the Utah 
Court of Appeals from the trial court's summary judgment 
dismissing her Complaint against petitioners here, Guardian 
Title Company of Utah and Warren H. Curlis. The Court of 
Appeals decision was entered on August 29, 1989. A copy of 
this decision is attached as Addendum I. The Trial Court 
Memorandum Decision granting summary judgment to Guardian and 
Curlis was signed by the Honorable David E. Roth on October 21, 
1985. R. at 520-2. A copy of the Memorandum Decision is 
attached as Addendum II. The trial court's judgment was 
entered on March 17, 1986. R. at 589-90. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about July 1, 1980, defendants Randy Krantz 
and B. Brad Christenson purchased from plaintiff Bette Wycalis 
a piece of real property located in Helper, Utah. R. at 384, 
434-5. 
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2. The sale of the property was financed in part by 
plaintiff. Defendants Randy Krantz, B. Brad Christenson, Debra 
S. Christenson and R. & C Associates ("R & C") executed a 
promissory note in favor of plaintiff and her mother, Eva R. 
Robertson, in the amount of $61,800. R. at 1, 384-5, 434. A 
copy of the promissory note is attached as Addendum III. 
3. To secure plaintiffs loan, R & C pledged as 
collateral certain real property it owned located in Weber 
County. R. at 385, 435. 
4. The lien created in favor of plaintiff is 
evidenced by a deed of trust naming R & C Associates as trustor 
and plaintiff and Eva Robertson as beneficiaries. R. at 385, 
435. A copy of the deed of trust is attached as Addendum IV. 
5. Eva Robertson, who is plaintiffs mother, has 
assigned to plaintiff her interest in both the promissory note 
and the trust deed. R. at 385, 435. 
6. Guardian Title Company acted as trustee under the 
deed of trust. It played no other role in the transaction. 
R. at 385, 435. 
7. On or about December 18, 1980, Guardian, as 
trustee, received a written, acknowledged Request for Full 
Reconveyance of the property subject to the trust deed, 
apparently signed by plaintiff and Eva Robertson. R. at 385, 
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436. A copy of the Request for Full Reconveyance is attached 
as Addendum V. 
8. Upon receiving the acknowledged Request for 
Reconveyance, Guardian complied with the request by executing 
and recording a Deed of Reconveyance of the property subject to 
the deed of trust. The Deed of Reconveyance was executed by 
Guardian's President, Warren H. Curlis. R. at 386, 436 A copy 
of the Deed of Reconveyance is attached as Addendum VI. 
9. The Request for Full Reconveyance states that the 
debt secured by the deed of trust "has been fully paid and 
satisfied . . . ." R. at 404; Addendum V. 
10. Guardian took no further steps to ascertain 
whether plaintiff, the beneficiary under the deed of trust, had 
been paid, prior to executing and recording the Deed of 
Reconveyance, other than to ascertain that the Request for Full 
Reconveyance was properly acknowledged. R. at 386, 436-7; 
Curlis Deposition, pp. 40, 42-3. 
11. Plaintiff alleges that the Request for 
Reconveyance was a forgery and that neither she nor Eva 
Robertson signed it. R. at 386, 437; Wycalis Deposition, 
pp. 81-2. Guardian assumed, for purposes of its motion for 
summary judgment below, R. at 386, appeal and assumes for 
purposes of this petition only, that the Request for 
Reconveyance is a forgery. 
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12. Guardian acted in good faith in executing and 
recording the deed of reconveyance in reliance upon the 
acknowledged request for reconveyance. There is no claim or 
evidence whatsoever of any improper motive on Guardian's part 
in this case, or that Guardian had reason to know that the 
Request for Reconveyance was forged. R. at 386; Wycalis 
Deposition, p. 92. 
13. Over the past few years Guardian has, in the 
capacity of trustee under deeds of trust, executed literally 
hundreds of deeds of reconveyance based on written requests for 
reconveyance. Except for the instance alleged in this lawsuit, 
Guardian knows of no other request for reconveyance submitted 
to it that has been forged. R. at 386-7, 399-40. 
14. When the deed of reconveyance was recorded by 
Guardian, plaintiff lost the benefit of the real property 
collateral securing her loan to defendants Krantz and the 
Christensons. R. at 387, 436. 
15. After the deed of reconveyance was recorded, a 
process virtually identical to that described above occurred 
again; plaintiff became the beneficiary under another deed of 
trust, describing a different piece of property, under which 
Guardian was also the trustee. After this deed of trust had 
been recorded, Guardian received another acknowledged request 
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for reconveyance of the property subject to this trust deed, 
which also had apparently been signed by plaintiff and Eva 
Robertson, Guardian accordingly executed and recorded a deed 
of reconveyance of this property, as it had done in response to 
the first acknowledged request. R. at 437-8. Plaintiff 
claims, however, she had no knowledge of events relating to the 
later trust deed. R. at 438. Further, plaintiff "does not 
have, nor does she claim, any interest in the substituted 
security." Appellant's Brief, p. 9. 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENTS 
This petition for a writ of certiorari is sought 
because the decision of the Court of Appeals, in conflict with 
the decisions of this Court, imposes a duty on persons to 
anticipate criminal activity of third parties. The decision of 
the Court of Appeals also vitiates the reliability of 
acknowledged commercial documents, causing certain and serious 
consequences for the entire business and legal community that 
as a matter of course relies on such acknowledgments. Thus, 
this petition for writ of certiorari is made to this Court upon 
the following specific grounds: 
1. The decision of the Court of Appeals is in 
conflict with legal principles established by this Court; 
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2. The Court of Appeals improperly raised arguments 
not raised by plaintiff and then resolved them in her favor; and 
3. The issues here involve important questions of 
state law that should be resolved by this Court* 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN 
CONFLICT WITH OTHER DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. 
In ruling that this case must be remanded to resolve 
factual issues that precluded the trial court's entry of 
summary judgment, the Court of Appeals did not appear to 
directly address Guardian's argument that it owed no duty to 
plaintiff to foresee a deliberate criminal act. Under Utah law 
it is clear that one has no duty to foresee and act upon a 
deliberate criminal act perpetrated by another. Accordingly, 
Guardian submits that as a matter of law that it cannot be 
liable to plaintiff in this action. Moreover, the contrary 
ruling by the Court of Appeals creates a conflict with the 
decision of this court in Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (Utah 
1977), which held there was no duty to anticipate and act upon 
the criminal conduct of another. 
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In this case, plaintiff alleges that some third party 
forged her name to an acknowledged request for reconveyance 
that was presented to Guardian, and upon which Guardian relied 
to execute a deed of reconveyance of plaintiff's trust 
property. Plaintiff claims Guardian is liable to her for 
acting in reliance on such an apparently forged, but 
nonetheless properly acknowledged, request for reconveyance. 
As Guardian argued in its initial brief, it is hornbook law 
that one has no duty to foresee such criminal misconduct of 
third parties. 
In Gray v. Scott, supra, the plaintiff in a wrongful 
death action appealed from a jury verdict in favor of 
defendant. In Gray, the decedent had been a guest at a New 
Year's Eve party at the defendant Beehive Elks Lodge. During 
the party, he got into a fight with another guest, Scott, at 
which point the lodge manager intervened and the parties 
departed. After both parties had left, the manager was told 
there had been a shooting outside in the alley. Neither the 
manager nor anyone else made any investigation. Later, both 
the decedent and Scott returned to the party, and Scott shot 
and killed the decedent. 
Plaintiff brought suit against Scott as well as the 
lodge, asserting that the lodge, after it became aware of a 
scuffle between the decedent and Scott and a shooting incident 
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in the alley, owed a legal duty to the decedent to take steps 
to prevent the fatal shooting from occurring. 
After a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the 
defendant lodge, plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial 
court had erred in giving the following instruction: 
You are instructed that a private lodge or 
association, as well as its officers, has no 
duty to anyone to anticipate that a crime 
will be committed by another person, and to 
act upon that belief. 
Id. at 77 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's argument. Even 
though the lodge manager was aware of a shooting incident in 
the alley, and thus the imminent risk of serious injury to 
those at the party, the Court held that the foregoing 
instruction properly stated Utah law: H[I]t was not error to 
instruct that defendants had no duty to anticipate the 
commission of the subject crime." Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 
The rule declared in Gray v. Scott should have 
disposed of the issue before the Court of Appeals in the 
instant case as a matter of law. In Gray, the defendant lodge 
manager was on notice of a specific and grave risk of harm to 
plaintiff and other guests. There had been a shooting right 
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outside his party. One might, in such a situation, reasonably 
foresee a shooting inside the party. Yet, the Court there held 
that defendant owed no duty to anticipate and protect plaintiff 
from the defendant's criminal act. 
The record in this case, quite to the contrary, 
indicates that Guardian had no notice whatsoever of any risk 
that plaintiff might be victimized by a criminal act. Instead, 
in reliance on a properly acknowledged request for 
reconveyance, Guardian performed the duties imposed on it by 
the Utah Code and reconveyed the trust property. It never had 
any reason to believe or suspect that the request was not 
authentic. 
In light of these uncontroverted facts, any forgery of 
the request was unforeseeable by Guardian as a matter of law. 
As the record shows, Guardian has executed literally hundreds 
of deeds of reconveyance based on written requests for 
reconveyance. On no other occasion has there ever been a 
forged request. R. at 399-400. This criminal forgery was 
completely unforeseeable to Guardian; under Gray v. Scott, 
Guardian owed no legal duty to protect plaintiff against it. 
See also Respondents' Brief on Appeal, pp. 28-37. The case at 
bar cannot be distinguished from Gray v. Scott. The Court of 
Appeals decision to the contrary creates a conflict with Gray 
v. Scott on the issue of what duty exists to anticipate and act 
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upon the criminal conduct of third parties. Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court should resolve this conflict. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY RAISED 
ISSUES NOT RAISED BY PLAINTIFF AND RELIED ON 
ISSUES PLAINTIFF RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL. 
In its decision, the Court of Appeals raised arguments 
not made by the plaintiff and resolved them in plaintiffs 
favor. The Court of Appeals also relied on arguments plaintiff 
raised for the first time on appeal. All this was done in 
contradiction of the well-established rule that appellate 
courts will not consider matters raised for the first time on 
appeal. Bundy v. Century Equipment Company, Inc., 692 P.2d 
754, 758 (Utah 1984); Franklin Financial v. New Empire 
Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). 
Despite plaintiff's express argument to the trial 
court and on appeal that the case could and should be resolved 
as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals determined plaintiff 
should be allowed to proceed to trial. Plaintiff did not raise 
this argument on her own behalf and the Court of Appeals should 
not have raised it for her and then used the argument to 
dispose of the appeal in plaintiffs favor. 
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The Court of AppeaLs also implicitly determined there 
were issues for trial concerning whether Guardian satisfied the 
proper standard of care in reconveying pursuant to a forged 
request and by not requiring plaintiff as beneficiary to 
surrender the original promissory note prior to reconveyance. 
Plaintiff raised these arguments for the first time on appeal, 
see Guardian's Brief at pp. 13, 25, 34, and thus they were 
improperly considered by the Court of Appeals. 
POINT III 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS RAISES 
IMPORTANT STATE LAW ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE 
RESOLVED BY THIS COURT. 
Apart from considerations of conflicting decisions and 
improperly-raised arguments, a writ of certiorari should issue 
because this case raises serious questions of state law that 
should be resolved by this court. These significant questions 
of law focus primarily on the duty of a party to anticipate the 
criminal activity of a third party and on the right of a 
trustee to rely and act on a properly acknowledged document. 
The first question is discussed extensively under 
Point I, supra. As noted above, this court has declared in 
Gray v. Scott, supra, that there is no duty to foresee criminal 
acts of a third party. This rule is consistent with the 
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 448 (1965), which provides as 
follows: 
The act of a third person in committing an 
intentional tort or crime is a superseding 
cause of harm to another resulting 
therefrom, although the actor's negligent 
conduct created a situation which afforded 
an opportunity to the third person to commit 
such a tort or crime, unless the actor at 
the time of his negligent conduct realized 
or should have realized the likelihood that 
such a situation might be created, and that 
a third person might avail himself of the 
opportunity to commit such a tort or crime. 
Moreover, numerous decisions in other jurisdictions apply this 
rule, holding as a matter of law that one owes no duty to 
anticipate the intentionally tortious or criminal acts of a 
third party. See, e.g., Gillot v. Washington Metropolitan Area 
Transit Authority, 507 F. Supp. 454, 457 (D.D.C. 1981); 
Citizens State Bank v. Martin, 609 P.2d 670, 676-7 (Kansas 
1980); Chavez v. Tolleson Elementary School District, 595 P.2d 
1017, 1022-3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). The Court of Appeals1 
decision to the contrary should be reviewed and revised to 
reflect established Utah law. 
Concerning the second significant question, the 
reliability of acknowledgments, the Court of Appeals1 decision 
effectively prevents anyone in the business or legal community 
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from safely relying on acknowledged documents. The trial 
court's holding, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, is 
clearly correct. The purpose of an acknowledgement is to place 
a stamp of authenticity on a document so that parties may 
thereafter, without further inquiry, reasonably rely on the 
document's genuineness. In granting Guardian's motion for 
summary judgment, the trial court properly recognized that 
because the request for reconveyance was properly acknowledged, 
Guardian was entitled to presume the document was authentic, 
and to act accordingly. 
Utah law declares in many places the reliability that 
as a matter of law, may be presumed from the acknowledgement of 
a document. For example, in Northcrest, Inc., v. Walker Bank & 
Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692 (Utah 1952), this Court held that the 
acknowledgement of a document creates a strong presumption of 
its genuineness: 
This presumption should not be regarded 
lightly, but should be given great weight. 
The authorities generally hold that the 
effect of such certificate of 
acknowledgement will not be overthrown by a 
mere preponderance of the evidence, but it 
must be clear and convincing. 
Id. at 694; Accord Webbe v. McGhie Land Title Co., 549 F.2d 
1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 1977); Gold Oil Land Development Corp. v. 
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Davis, 611 P.2d 711, 712 (Utah 1980); State ex rel. First Trust 
& Savings Bank v. Easlev, 140 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tenn. 1940) ("A 
certificate of acknowledgement is an act which must in the 
nature of things be relied on with confidence by men of 
business."); State ex rel. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. v. 
Otto, 276 S.W. 96, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925) ("It is well settled 
that one is entitled to rely upon a notary certificate and is 
not required to doubt the truth of the certificate and go out 
and verify its statement."). 
Acknowledged documents not only carry a heavy 
presumption of genuineness, they are also self-authenticating 
under the Utah Rules of Evidence. That is, under Rule 902(8) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, an acknowledged document is, 
without any further proof, what it purports to be. The Notes 
of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
from which the new Utah Rules were taken, state that 
acknowledged documents, as well as other documents set out in 
Rule 902, are admissible without foundational testimony as to 
their authenticity "because practical considerations reduce the 
possibility of unauthenticity to a very small dimension." Fed. 
R. Evid. 902 Advisory Committee Notes. The Notes further 
state, with specific reference to acknowledged documents, that 
"[i]f this authentication suffices for documents of the 
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importance of those affecting titles, logic scarcely permits 
denying this method when other kinds of documents are 
involved,M Fed, R. Evid. 902(8) Advisory Committee Notes. 
Finally, and significantly, acknowledgement of any 
document affecting real estate entitles it to be recorded: 
A certificate of the acknowledgement of 
any conveyance, or of the proof of the 
execution thereof as provided in this title, 
signed and certified by the officer taking 
the same as provided in this title, shall 
entitle such conveyance, with the 
certificate or certificates aforesaid, to be 
recorded in the office of the recorder of 
the county in which the real estate is 
situated. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-1 (1953). In short, under Utah law the 
acknowledgement of a document constitutes the indicia of 
authenticity that the county recorder is entitled to rely on 
before recording a document. 
The above authorities demonstrate the great weight 
accorded to acknowledged documents under Utah law. They carry 
a presumption of reliability that can be overcome only by clear 
and convincing evidence; they may be relied on by judges and 
juries as presumptively authentic; and finally, the county 
recorder may rely on their genuineness. Furthermore, people 
throughout the real estate industry in this state do and must 
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rely on the presumptive authenticity of acknowledged documents 
for that system to function effectively. R. at 393. 
The Court of Appeals' decision threatens the effective 
functioning of this system. Guardian submits that, like a 
judge admitting evidence or the county recorder recording a 
document, it was entitled as a matter of law to rely on the 
genuineness of the request for reconveyance submitted to it. 
Indeed, it is evident that the very purpose of acknowledgements 
is to permit parties, such as Guardian, to presume the 
authenticity of acknowledged documents without further inquiry 
into or evidence of their genuineness. If, as is the result 
reached by the Court of Appeals, Guardian and others like it 
could not so rely, the salutary purposes advanced by the 
acknowledgement of documents would be completely undermined; 
acknowledgements would be rendered meaningless. This reason 
alone merits review by this Court of the decision by the Court 
of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals creates a 
conflict with legal principles established in decisions of this 
Court and is based on improperly raised arguments. Moreover, 
the decision portends serious detrimental consequences for the 
business and legal community by requiring the anticipation of 
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criminal acts by third parties and by vitiating the reliability 
of acknowledged documents. Thus, this case involves important 
issues that are best decided by this Court. Accordingly, 
petitioners respectfully request that this Court grant their 
petition for a writ of certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of October, 1989. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
David R. Mtfney 
Michael Patrle^O',Brien 
Attorneys forPetitioners 
Guardian Title Company of Utah 
and Warren H. Curlis 
-20-
COVER SHEET 
CASE TITLE: 
Bette Wycalis, 
Plaintiff and Appellant/ 
v. Court of Appeals No. 880030-CA 
Guardian Title of 
Utah and Warren H. Curlis, its 
president: City Federal 
Savings & Loan Association; 
U.S. Life of Utah/ trustee; 
City Consumer Services/ Inc./ 
beneficiary; R. M. Wall; Gary L. 
Meredith; Lyle G. Meredith; 
Ed Maas; Randy Krantz; 
B. Brad Christenson; Debra 
Christenson; and John Does I through V, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
PARTIES: 
Joseph E. Hatch (Argued) 
Garrett and Sturdy 
Attorneys for Krantz and Christenson 
257 East 2nd South/ Suite 640 
Salt Lake City# UT 84111 
Dallas H. Young# Jr. 
Sherman C. Young (Argued) 
Ivie & Young 
Attorneys for Wycalis 
P. 0. Box 672 
48 North University Avenue 
ProvO/ UT 84601 
George W. Pratt (Argued) 
David R. Money 
Jones/ Waldo/ Holbrook & McDonough 
Attorneys for Guardian Title and Warren Curliss 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main 
Salt Lake City/ UT 84101 
Eric P. Hartman 
Attorney for Krantz and Christenson 
301 Gump & Ayers Bldg. 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City# UT 84106 
ADDENDUM I 
Page 2 
TRIAL JUDGE: 
Ronald O. Hyde 
Second District Court 
Weber County Court 
2549 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84401 
August 29, 1989 OPINION 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the 
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the district 
court herein be, and the same is, reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion 
filed herein. Each party shall bear their own costs of this appeal. 
Opinion of the Court by GREGORY K, ORME, Judge; RICHARD C. DAVIDSON 
and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judges, concur. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of August, 1989, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing OPINION was mailed or personally delivered 
to each of the above parties. 
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ORME, Judge: 
Bette Wycalis, formerly the beneficiary under a trust 
deed, appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment 
terminating her action against Guardian Title of Utah, the 
trust deed trustee, and its president, Warren Curlis. This 
appeal was consolidated with another which arose from a 
separate judgment entered in the same case. However, this 
opinion treats only the Wycalis appeal. We reverse and remand 
for further proceedings. 
. AU&2 81989 
/v^ux/ /jfopyj Noontn 
*KJ CWK'A o< ** Court 
O P I N I O N u**n Court *< App©«te 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880030(A)-CA 
FACTS 
In July 1980, Wycalis sold Randy Krantz and Brad and 
Debra Christenson a parcel of real estate located in Helper, 
Utah. A promissory note dated July 1, 1980, payable to Wycalis 
and her mother, Eva Robertson, was delivered to Wycalis as 
partial payment for the Helper property.1 The makers of the 
promissory note were R & C Associates, Krantz, and the 
Christensons. The note was secured by a standard, short form 
trust deed dated June 26, 1980. The trust deed, signed only by 
R & C Associates, was properly executed and created a lien in 
Wycalis*s favor on a parcel of Weber County property owned by 
R & C Associates. Guardian Title was named as trustee under 
the trust deed. 
Wycalis received payments on the note from August 1980 
through December 1982, at which time all payments ceased, 
leaving the note substantially unpaid. Wycalis then contacted 
Guardian to enforce her rights under the trust deed. Guardian 
informed Wycalis that on December 26, 1980, the Weber County 
property had been reconveyed to the trustor, R & C Associates, 
pursuant to a request for reconveyance allegedly bearing 
Wycalis*s signature. Wycalis protested this divestment of her 
security interest in the property. Subsequent investigation 
revealed that Wycalis's signature had been forged on the 
request for reconveyance which Guardian had received and relied 
on in reconveying the trust deed property. 
The forged request for reconveyance was acknowledged by a 
notary who was either duped or corrupted. This document was 
accompanied by a letter requesting the substitution of a trust 
deed on different property as security for the promissory 
note.2 Wycalisfs signature was also forged on this letter. 
1. On March 31, 1983, Eva Robertson assigned her interest in 
the promissory note to Wycalis. 
2. Following the reconveyance of the original trust deed and 
pursuant to the letter's instructions, Guardian recorded the 
substituted trust deed in favor of Wycalis. This second deed 
encumbered a parcel of property different from the Weber County 
parcel initially encumbered. Thereafter, this second trust 
deed was reconveyed by Guardian after it received yet another 
forged request for reconveyance. Wycalis does not claim any 
interest in the property purportedly secured by the subsequent 
trust deed nor does she claim any damages arising from its 
reconveyance. 
Upon receiving the two forged documents, Guardian did not 
contact Wycalis to verify her request, nor did it require 
delivery of the original promissory note or trust deed, 
although the request for reconveyance recited the note had been 
paid and erroneously indicated these documents were attached.3 
Wycalis filed a complaint against Guardian, Curlis, 
Krantz, the Christensons, and a number of other parties not 
involved in this or the related appeal. Wycalis claimed that 
Guardian Title breached its duty as trustee by reconveying the 
trust deed property and releasing her corresponding security 
interest based on a forged request for reconveyance. Wycalis 
also sought a judgment against Krantz and the Christensons for 
the unpaid balance of the promissory note. The trial court 
entered summary judgment against Wycalis and in favor of 
Guardian. The trial court also entered summary judgment in 
favor of Wycalis and against Krantz and the Christensons for 
the unpaid balance of the promissory note. As indicated, both 
judgments have been appealed, but we treat only the former in 
this opinion. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The procedural history of Wycalis's claim against 
Guardian is important to an understanding of our decision and 
merits detailed review. 
Prior to Guardian's successful motion for summary 
judgment, Wycalis filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
on the question of Guardian's liability. Wycalis claimed 
Guardian was liable for the loss of her security interest 
because the reconveyance was unauthorized. She cited several 
cases in support of her argument. E.g., Huckell v. Matrancra, 
160 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Cal. App. 1979); Dovle v. Surety Title & 
Guar. Co., 68 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Cal. App. 1968); Jeanese, Inc. v. 
Surety Title & Guar. Co., 1 Cal. Rptr. 752 (Cal. App. 1959). 
Guardian's response was, primarily, to distinguish those cases 
from the instant case, claiming that they involved situations 
where no authorization had been received by the trustee while 
3. The reference to the note being ,paid and to these documents 
being attached is curious, not only because they were not 
attached, but also because a request to substitute security is 
altogether inconsistent with a representation that the note has 
been paid. 
Guardian had received apparent, acknowledged authorization to 
reconvey the property• Since Hthe acknowledgment of a document 
gives rise to a presumption of its genuineness," Guardian 
argued, a factual question existed concerning whether the 
trustee's unquestioning reliance on that document was 
consistent with the applicable duty of care. Guardian observed 
that the only case relied on by Wycalis involving a forged 
request for reconveyance was not resolved as a matter of law 
but instead had been submitted to the trier of fact. See 
Stephans v. Herman. 37 Cal. Rptr. 746 (Cal. App. 1964). 
Guardian emphasized the need for -evidence as to the standard 
of care in the local title company industry" before it could 
properly be determined that Guardian breached its duty. 
Wycalis's response was uncharacteristic of modern 
litigants. She conceded the validity of Guardian's argument/ 
the inescapable presence of material factual questions/ and the 
corresponding need for a trial. Accordingly/ she withdrew her 
motion. 
It was several months later that Guardian filed its own 
motion for summary judgment/ now changing its tack 
considerably. Guardian argued that it owed no duty to foresee 
and protect against criminal acts# such as forgery-/ and that/ 
in any event/ it was entitled to rely on the acknowledged 
request as a matter of law. In her response, Wycalis 
unfortunately failed to remind the court of Guardian's prior 
concession of unavoidable factual issues and of the need for 
standard-of-care-in-the-industry evidence, which had not been 
offered by Guardian in support of its motion.4 Nor did 
4. The record contains two affidavits submitted by Guardian 
which merit comment in this regard. The first affidavit is 
that of Craig Thomsen/ president of a local title company/ 
which was submitted by Guardian in its opposition to Wycalis's 
motion for summary judgment but not relied on in support of its 
own motion. Moreover/ Guardian contended that Thomsen's 
affidavit demonstrated the need for a trial and the impropriety 
of Wycalis's motion/ not that Thomsen's affidavit established 
the standard of care as a matter of law. The second affidavit 
is that of Warren Curlis# which is also insufficient to 
establish the standard of care as a matter of law. Curlis does 
not attempt to identify any industry standard in his affidavit/ 
but merely states his own personal experience and the fact that 
he had not previously encountered a forged request for 
reconveyance. Thus, these affidavits do not establish that 
Guardian met the applicable standard of care as a matter of law. 
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Wycalis directly refute Guardian's new legal arguments. 
Instead/ she too changed tack. In essence, her response was 
that Guardian's new arguments were irrelevant because a forged 
reconveyance, even if acknowledged, is an absolute nullity. 
Thus, according to Wycalis, Guardian had, in effect, released 
the security without any authority whatsoever and was therefore 
liable for the loss as a matter of law. 
It was in this posture of each party asserting its 
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law that the district 
court took Guardian's motion for summary judgment under 
advisement. Thereafter, the district court granted Guardian's 
motion, concluding that the "great weight" afforded 
acknowledged documents entitled Guardian to rely on the request 
in this case since there was no showing that Guardian had any 
reason to suspect a forgery. The propriety of that disposition 
is the gravamen of this appeal. 
STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary disposition of lawsuits is a valuable and 
necessary tool in a judicial system such as ours, which strives 
for the efficient and timely resolution of legal disputes. 
Granting summary judgment saves the parties and the courts the 
time and expense of a full-blown trial. See, e.g., Amiacs 
Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 
1981). However, summary judgment is appropriate only where 
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). See, e.g.. Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 
733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); Barber v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Briggs v. 
Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Appellate 
courts scrutinize summary judgments under the same standard 
applied by the trial courts, according no particular deference 
to the trial court's legal conclusions concerning whether the 
material facts are in dispute and, if they are not, what legal 
result obtains. See, e.g., Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 
247 (Utah 1988); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 
225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
[W]e consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the losing party, and 
affirm only where it appears there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material issues 
of fact, or where, even according to the 
facts as contended by the losing party, 
the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Themv v. Seagull Enters., Inc. 595 P,2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 
1979), See also, e.g., Barber, 751 P.2d at 251; Briggs, 740 
P.2d at 283. 
Every summary judgment must withstand scrutiny under the 
foregoing standards, even where a trial court was confronted 
with cross-motions for such relief. Despite the parties1 
apparent mutual perception in such situations that the material 
facts are not in dispute, it does not automatically follow that 
summary disposition is appropriate.5 "Cross-motions for 
summary judgment do not ipso facto dissipate factual issues, 
even though both parties contend . • . that they are entitled 
to prevail because there are no material issues of fact.-
Amiacs, 635 P.2d at 55. See also Diamond T Utah, Inc. v. 
Travelers Indem. Co., 21 Utah 2d 124, 441 P.2d 705, 706 
(1968). Rather, cross-motions may be viewed as involving a 
contention by each movant that no genuine issue of fact exists 
under the theory it advances, but not as a concession that no 
dispute remains under the theory advanced by its adversary. 
&££, £*£[., DeStefano v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1123, 
1124 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In effect, each cross-movant 
implicitly contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law, but that if the court determines otherwises, factual 
disputes exist which preclude judgment as a matter of law in 
favor of the other side. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN NEGLIGENCE CASES 
The summary judgment challenged here disposes of what 
amounts to a negligence claim by Wycalis against Guardian. But 
see note 9, infra. Specifically, Wycalis contends that 
Guardian breached its duty as trustee under the trust deed in 
reconveying Wycalis1s interest without her actual 
5. Although Wycalis had withdrawn her prior motion for summary 
judgment and had not technically filed a cross-motion, the 
situation was essentially one of cross-motions since her 
response to Guardian*s motion was that she, not Guardian, was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
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authorization. As a general proposition, summary judgment is 
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its merits, and 
should be employed "only in the most clear-cut case.- Ingram, 
733 P.2d at 126. See also Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 
706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Williams v. Melbv, 
699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 
172 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton Citv, 656 P.2d 434, 436 
(Utah 1982). Of particular concern is the precept that 
"[o]rdinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required 
standard of care is a question of fact for the jury." Jackson 
v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). See also Ingram, 733 
P.2d at 127; Bowen, 656 P.2d at 437; FMA Acceptance Co. v. 
Leatherbv Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332, 1334-35 (Utah 1979); Robison 
v. Robison, 16 Utah 2d 2, 394 P.2d 876, 877 (1964). 
Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate unless the 
applicable standard of care is "fixed by law," Elmer v. 
Vanderford, 445 P.2d 612, 614 (Wash. 1968); see also Chicago, 
Rock Island and Pac. R.R. v. Hawes, 424 P.2d 6, 10 (Okla. 
1967), and reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as 
to the defendant's negligence under the circumstances. See 
Jackson, 645 P.2d at 615; Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 
292, 431 P.2d 126, 129 (1967); English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 
1154, 1156 (Ct. App. 1989). Furthermore, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that since summary disposition denies the losing 
party "the privilege of a trial," art. I, § 11 of the Utah 
Constitution6 suggests that "doubt or uncertainty as to the 
questions of negligence . . . should be resolved in favor of 
granting . . . a trial." Butler v. Sports Haven Int'l, 563 
P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah 1977). £££ also Anderson, 671 P.2d at 
172; Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978). 
With the foregoing standards in mind, we must determine 
whether Wycalis's negligence claim was properly resolved by the 
district court as a matter of law, given the posture of the 
case. 
IMPROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR GUARDIAN 
There are two fundamental problems with the summary 
judgment at issue in this appeal. First, we cannot agree that 
the standard of care owed by Guardian to Wycalis is "fixed by 
6. Art. I, § 11 is commonly known as the "open courts-
provision. 
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law" or even conducive to an Has a matter of law" 
determination, especially in the absence of uncontroverted 
standard-of-the-industry evidence. 
It is true that the applicable standard of care in a 
given case may be established, as a matter of law, by 
legislative enactment or prior judicial decision. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 285 (1965). See also Elmer v. Vanderford, 
445 P.2d 613, 614 (Wash. 1968). Nonetheless, Guardian has not 
demonstrated that the standard of care owed by a trustee under 
a trust deed when presented with a request for reconveyance has 
been established in either of these ways. Thus, we are not 
convinced that the applicable standard has yet been established 
in Utah "as a matter of law."7 Accordingly, the standard 
must be established factually in the course of ultimate 
7. We necessarily reject Wycalis6s contention that trust deed 
trustees are subject to what in essence would be a strict 
liability standard. In this regard, Wycalis relies on Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-33 (1986), which provides, with our emphasis, 
that "rwlhen the obligation secured by any trust deed has been 
satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request; by the 
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property." Wycalis suggests 
this language means the trustee has no authority to reconvey 
property while the obligation is unpaid, and if the trust 
property is reconveyed in such circumstances, the trustee is 
strictly liable to the beneficiary. Such a construction is at 
odds with actual commercial practice under which a beneficiary 
is entitled to have the property reconveyed upon his or her 
instruction, whether or not the obligation has been paid, 
either because the beneficiary and the obligor agree to 
substitute other security, upon receipt of additional 
consideration, as part of a loan work-out, or simply because 
the beneficiary feels like it. A reading of § 57-1-33 in its 
entirety suggests that it is intended to operate only as a 
procedural guide for trustees. We note that in drafting 
§ 57-1-33 the Legislature was very explicit and went to great 
lengths to define the duties of the beneficiary and the 
resulting liability for breach of those duties. In light of 
this observation, we cannot agree that the Legislature intended 
the first eleven words of § 57-1-33 to impose strict liability 
on trustees. If such an onerous burden was intended, we think 
the Legislature would have explicitly said so rather than leave 
the matter for inference. 
ftAnmn_rA 8 
resolution of this case, with an emphasis on standard-of-care-
in-the-industry evidence.8 
As discussed above, a trial court may not grant summary 
judgment and thereby deny the plaintiff a trial on the 
negligence issue, including resolving the applicable standard 
of care, unless it correctly concludes that the jury could not 
reasonably find the defendant's conduct to be negligent.9 
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285 comment f at 22 
(1965). We hold that a jury could reasonably conclude the 
standard of care owed by Guardian to Wycalis required more than 
unquestioning reliance on the forged request, even though 
8. Expert testimony may be particularly helpful in elucidating 
the standard of care applicable here. Where the average person 
has little understanding of the duties owed by particular 
trades or professions, expert testimony must ordinarily be 
presented to establish the standard of care. For instance, 
expert testimony has been required to establish the standard of 
care for medical doctors, Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 
821 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); architects, Nauman v. Harold K. 
Beecher & Assocs.. 24 Utah 2d 172, 467 P.2d 610, 615 (1970); 
engineers, National Housing Indust., Inc. v. E. L. Jones Dev. 
£o., 118 Ariz. 374, 576 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Ct. App. 1978); 
insurance brokers, cf. Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal 
Underwriters Ins. Co.. 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388, 403 (1984) 
(establishing standard of care "may require expert testimony"); 
and professional estate executors. Estate of Beach. 125 Cal. 
Rptr. 570, 542 P.2d 994, 1001 (1975) (en banc). But see 
Daniel, Mann. Johnson & Mendenhall v. Hilton Hotels Corp.. 642 
P.2d 1086, 1087 (Nev. 1982) (expert testimony not required to 
prove negligence of surveyor). 
9. Our emphasis on "negligence" analysis should not be taken 
as an implicit rejection of Wycalis's contention that a trust 
deed trustee is a fiduciary held to a standard higher than one 
of ordinary care. On the contrary, courts have recognized that 
a trust deed trustee is a fiduciary. See, e.g., Mclntvre v. 
Ticor Title Ins. Co.. 658 Supp. 944, 950 (D. Alaska 1986); 
Hoffman v. First Bond & Mort. Co.. 116 Conn. 320, 164 A. 656, 
658 (1933). See also Spruill v. Ballard. 58 F.2d 517, 519 
(D.C. App. 1932) ("trustee named in a deed of trust to secure a 
loan sustains a fiduciary relation to the debtor as well as the 
creditor") (cited with approval in Blodaett v. Martsch, 590 
P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978)). Nonetheless, the fiduciary nature 
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apparently acknowledged,10 as the basis for reconveying the 
beneficiary's interest. In short, Guardian was correct when it 
asserted, in opposing Wycalis°s prior motion for summary 
judgment, that the standard of care could not be established, 
as a practical matter, without a trial. 
Second, and closely related to the point above, we 
believe that a jury could also reasonably conclude that 
Guardian breached whatever duty it owed Wycalis even though it 
relied on an acknowledged document. Although the posture of 
this case admittedly leaves us with some doubt as to whether 
Wycalis can convince a jury that she is entitled to prevail, 
consistent with precedent we resolve that doubt in favor of 
permitting Wycalis an opportunity to proceed to trial. See 
Butler, 563 P.2d at 1246-47. 
(Footnote 9 continued) 
of the trustee's responsibility really goes to the standard of 
care to which a trustee is held, rather than to supplant 
negligence analysis. See, e.g., Estate of Beach, 125 Cal. 
Rptr. 570, 542 P.2d 994, 1001 (1975) (en banc) (fiduciary held 
to "more stringent standards,- consistent with rule that 
"[tlhose undertaking to render expert services in the practice 
of a profession or trade are required to have and apply the 
skill, knowledge and competence ordinarily possessed by their 
fellow practitioners under similar circumstances, and failure 
to do so subjects them to liability for negligence**). 
10. It is of course true that acknowledged documents have a 
special status in certain contexts. Properly acknowledged 
documents may be admitted into evidence without other evidence 
of their authenticity. See Utah R. Evid. 902(8). Subject to 
certain exceptions, see Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-3 (1986), only 
acknowledged documents are entitled to recordation. Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-3-1 (1986). It does not necessarily follow, however, 
that a trust deed trustee can be said to have fully discharged 
its duty of care in reconveying property in response to a 
written submission which includes an acknowledged request for 
reconveyance. 
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CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment is reversed. We remand for trial or 
such other proceedings as may be appropriate. The parties 
shall bear their own costs of this appeal. 
Grego;ry K. Orme, Judge 
CUR: 
^&*-^/ L^J^^UA^J^ 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Russell W. B e n ^ T o u * ^ ^ 
-^ stv*. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BETTE WYCALIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., 3 
Defendant. ) 
> MEMORANDUM DECISION 
i Case No. 88766 
After considering defendants Guardian Title Company and 
Warren H. Curlis1 motion for summary judgment and reviewing the 
affidavits and memoranda presented by both plaintiff and 
defendants, the Court rules as follows: 
The Court finds that, based upon the statement of both 
parties, there are no material disputed facts. 
Defendants, Guardian Title and Warren H. Curlis, as 
trustee, executed a deed of reconveyance after receiving an 
acknowledged request (purportedly from plaintiff) stating that 
the debt had been paid and that the property could be reconveyed. 
The acknowledged request was a forged document, the debt had not 
been paid, and plaintiff was divested of her security interest. 
Plaintiff argues that defendant was negligent in not contacting 
plaintiff prior to the reconveyance to confirm that the debt had 
in fact been paid. 
ADDENDUM II 
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Case No. 88766 
The issue is whether a trustee is entitled to rely on a 
writtenf acknowledged request stating that the debt has been paid 
and requesting that the property be reconveyed or whether the 
trustee has a duty to take further steps to confirm that the debt 
has in fact been satisfied prior to the reconveyance. 
Defendant argues and gives authority for the position 
that he had no duty to foresee the criminal acts of another and 
was entitled to rely on an acknowledged document. Defendant's 
authorities suggest that, under Utah law and Rules of Evidence, 
acknowledged documents are accorded great weight to the extent 
that they may be relied upon by judges and juries as presump-
tively authentic. 
Plaintiff argues that defendant was negligent in failing 
to know or take steps to know that the debt had, prior to recon-
veyance, been paid. Plaintiff gives authority for the position 
that a trustee will be liable when property is reconveyed without 
authorization. Apparently, none of plaintiff's cases deal with 
the issue of whether or not a trustee is negligent in relying 
solely on an acknowledged request. 
The Court finds that Utah cases and Rules of Evidence, 
which give great weight to acknowledged documents, compel a 
ruling that, in a case such as this, a trustee is not negligent 
in relying on an acknowledged request to reconvey property unless 
the trustee has reason to believe the request is forged. No 
(xv) 
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Case No. 88766 
evidence has been presented to suggest that the trustee should 
have been suspicious of the document; therefore, defendants' 
motion for summary judgment is granted. 
DATED this 2( day of October, 1985. 
r DAVID E. ROTH, Jud^e 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this & ' day of October, 1985, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was 
served upon the following: 
Sherman C. Young 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 672 
Pr'ovo, Utah 84602 
George W. Pratt 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MC DONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant Guardian Title 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Joseph Hatch 
Attorney at Law 
311 South State #320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Eric Hartman 
Attorney at Law 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utafr^  8 4106/ 
( 
INSTALLMENT PROMISSORY NuTE 
* 6JL.8J0fl.JML.... - i! i iJ. . . . i 19 ..!.?.„ 
For value received, I, we, or either of us, promise to pay to the order of .BEXT.E...l^.CALIS_and _ 
EVA ROBERTSON 
at 3Q8 N o r t h 400 E a s t { P a y s o n , Utah , the sum of 
SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND NO/100 . . . t o o 
together with interest on the unpaid balance thereof from date at the rate of ...9.;..™ percent per 
annum, in lawful money of the United States, in monthly installments of * 7.5.6 ...5 2 each on the 
....i.s.t day of each and every month beginning with the ....„.?..*:. day of ....£?JL^™T 
19 ...8..0.... and continuing until the whole thereof shall have been fully paid. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers of this note jointly and severally agree that if any installment is not 
paid when due, that the whole of the principal sum then remaining unpaid, together with the accrued interest thereon 
shall forthwith become due and payable at the option of the holder of this note, and that beginning with the date of such 
default the whole of said unpaid principal shall bear interest at the rate of KXpercent per annum both, before and 
after judgment. 1 0 . 5 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally consent to renewals and extensions at or after ma-
turity hereof and waive presentment for payment, notice of dishonor, protest and notice thereof, and agree to pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee, together with all costs and expenses incurred- in the event that this note is placed in the 
, hands of any attorney for collection. R & C y A S S O C I A T E S , / 
Address M&JM^&^J&llS-J>£~. L B X . L - ^ S ^ ^ S f c 4 f e Z . - r ™ -
Address ...9.5A..Waljden..J3ills..I>X.iv»5./ 8. ••^^^-^Q^i^^K 
SLC, UTAH t. ^ - 3 / s*y • / -
Address P.. 0*. BQX 5Q2 3. -O aJtr-f^r '^--ns^io* ^. " .J50Z 3.YriceT Utah * "845*01 "~ '^n^l 
This note and the interest thereon is secured by a Second*Trust ueect dated June 26, 1980 
on property located in Weber Coujr^_fUtah_. 
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SECOND 
Crust gbzcb 
THIS TRUST DEED is made this 26th day of Juftt 
between R & C ASSOCIATES, a general partnership 
whose address is 
(Street and Number) 
GUAROIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH 
BETTE WYCALIS and EYA ROBERTSON 
Bountiful 
(City) 
6f,TER£D C MCROFILMcD U 
,19 80 
, as Trustor, 
Utah 
(SUM) 
, as Trustee,* and 
, as Beneficiary 
Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST WITH POWER 
OF SALE, the following described property situated in Weber County, Utah. 
Beginning at a point which l ies South 0°28'07" West 949.73 feet 
and North 89°31'16" East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Comer of 
the Southwest Quarter of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2 
West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89333'00" 
East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Davis Canal; thence South ?1°03,35M 
West along said canal 106.85 fee t ; thence South 89°33'00" West 
209.78 feet to the East Rioht-of-Way l ine of 1900 West Street; 
thence North 0°28*07" East along said Riqht-of-Way l ine 39.42 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, 
easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory 
note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ 61 ,300.00 , pavable to the order of 
Beneficiary at the tune*, in the maxinei and with interest as therein set forth, and payment of any 
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security hereof. 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the shove property, to pay all charges and 
assessments on water or water stock used on or with said property, not to commit «aste, to maintain 
adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property, to pay all costs and expenses of collec-
tion (including Trustee's and attorney's fees in event of default in payment of the indebtedness se-
cured hereby) and to pay reasonable Trustee s fees for any of the services performed by Trustee 
hereunder, including s reconveyance hereof. 
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
R A C ASSOCIATES., a general .partnership 
.Mi. J^^lf.^^^C 
Roy L. Holler general p r partner 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF Salt Lake 
On the 2 6 t h day of June , 19 80
 t personally appeared before me 
ROY L. MILLER who being duly sworn did say that he is a general partner of R 4 C 
ASSOCIATES, a general partnership and that said instrument was sioned in behalf of 
said partnership by authori ty, and said ROY L. MILLER acknowledged to me that he as 
such general partner executed the same in the name of the partnership. 
IIK />. Yi^cj.. 
My Commission Expires: June 28, 1981 Residing at: 
Notary Public 
Kaysvilie, Utah 
•NOTE Trustee must be a member of the Utah State B a r a bank building and loan associauon or savuics and 
loan association authorized to do such business in Utah a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah, or a tide insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. 
REQUEST TOR FULL RECON.'YA.V 
TO. GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH (Trustee) 
The undersigned is the legal owner and hclder of the Note and a"! ctrer 
indebtedness secured by the Trust Deed dated t~: 26th day of June 
19 80 recorded the 15th day cf M y
 Vr^fae^ _ , 1? *~ ir poo* 
Ubl , Page 7b\ recorcs c* ixdxxxxxjyixxxxxx ula , Said 
Note, together with all otner indebtedness secured by said Trj;t De-.. r.c.s beer 
fully paid and satisfied, and you are hereby re* .ested and dircrted, or oa/nert 
to you af any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trjst C-.-ji, to carcel 
said Note above mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured 
by said Trust Deed delivered to you herewith, together with the said Tryst Deed 
and to reconvey, without warranty to the parties designated by tne ter*s of said 
Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder in and to the property 
decribed as follows: 
Beginning at a point which lies South 0°28,07H West 949.73 feet and North 
89°3ri6" East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter 
of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
thence North 89°33,00M East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Oavis Canal; thence South 
2r03*35" West along said canal 106.85 feet; thence South 89o33'00" West 209 78 
feet to the East Right-of-Way line of 1900 West Street, thence North 0°2S'07M 
East along said Right-of-Way line 99.42 feet to the point of beginning. 
Dated December 18. 1980 
EvaKOoertson 
State of Utah 
County of 
)ss 
On the ^L dav of 
appeared before me Btnt wYCALlS 
December . 19 80
 % personally 
l^d EVA-*dBERT50T7 
acknowledged to me that they executed the same 
_the signers of tne within instrument wno auly 
My Commission Expires: f*-\~t) 
Notary Puolic 
Residing in* /*\arra/ , Utrsh 
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Jlccb of Jlmuttirumicc 
(Corporate Trustee) 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH 
under a Trust Deed dated June 25, 
R & C ASSOCIATES, a general partnership 
and recorded July 15, , 19 80 , as Entry No. 814366 
, a* 2 ruMtt* 
, 19 SO , excruu-d by 
. as Trustor, 
.in Book 1361 , 
Page(s) 761 of the records of the County Recorder of Weber County. Utah, 
pursuant to a written request of the Beneficiary thereunder, dors hereby recunvey, without warrantv, 
to the person or persona entitled thereto, the trust property now held by it as Trustee under said 
Trust Deed, which Trust Deed covers real property situated in Weber 
Utah, described as follows: 
County, 
BEGINNING at a point which l ies South 0°28'07" West 949.73 feet and North 
e9°3ri6M East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter 
of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2 West of the Salt lake Base and 
teridian; thence North 89°33'00" East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Davis Canal; 
thence South 21°03l35" West along said canal 106.85 feet; thence Soutn 89° 
33'00M West 209.78 feet to the'East Right of Way line of 1900 West Street 
thence North 0#28'Q7" East along said Right of Way line 99.42 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
Dstedthia 26th day of Decenfcer .19 80 
Bv S^'O-
WA&REN H. GURU'S President 
Trustee 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OPUIt take I 
On the 26 th day of December , 19 80 , personally appeared be/uru me 
WARREN H. CURLIS , who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the 
PRESI0ENT of GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH 
s corporation, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of it* 
by-laws (or by a resolution of its board of directors) and said WARREN H. CURL IS 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same. 
V / ' ^ _ ^:i,lli/l..A .uL_ 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expiivs: 6-28-81 Residing at: Kaysvil le , Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the oMj?tS day of October, 
1989, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT, to the following: 
Dallas H. Young, Jr. 
Sherman C. Young 
IVIE AND YOUNG 
48 North University 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorneys for Bette Wycalis 
Joseph E. Hatch 
257 East Second South 
Suite 640 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Randy Krantz 
Eric P. Hartman 
SAMUEL KING & ASSOCIATES 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Attorney for B. Brad and Debra Christenson 
mob 275/jf 
UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
F I L E D 
SEP2 519S9 
CJ«*-K cr 4n* Tic. >rt 
Bette WycaliS/ 
Plaintiff and Appellant/ 
v. 
City Federal Savings & Loan 
Association; Guardian Title 
Company of Utah and Warren H. 
CurliS/ its President; U.S. Title 
of Utah, Trustee; City Consumer 
Services/ Inc./ Beneficiary; R.M. 
Wall; Gary L. Meredith and Lyle G. 
Meredith; Ed Maass; Randy KrantZ/ 
B. Brad Christenson, Debra S. 
Christenson; R & C Associates; 
Roy L. Miller; Sharon L. Miles, 
and John Does I through X, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
No. 880030-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for Rehearing 
filed by the respondents/ Guardian Title Company of Utah and 
Warren H. Curlis; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the respondent's petition is denied, 
lis Dated thi day of September, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
'MtZ 
oonan/ Clerk 
urt of Appeals 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on 26, September 1989 I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 
REHEARING by depositing the same with the United States Mail/ 
postage prepaid to the following: 
Joseph E. Hatch 
Garrett and Sturdy 
Attorneys for Krantz and Christenson 
257 East 2nd South, Suite 640 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dallas H. Young, Jr. 
Sherman C. Young 
Ivie & Young 
Attorneys for Wycalis 
P. O. Box 672 
48 North University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84601 
George W. Pratt 
David R. Money 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
Attorneys for Guardian Title and Warren Curliss 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Eric P. Hartman 
Attorney for Krantz and Christenson 
301 Gump & Ayers Bldg. 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
DATED this 26th day of September, 1989. 
Kathleen Flynn" ^ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
